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A recent Note in this Review argued that a cause of action should be available under rule iob-51 for traders of options on corporate stock against insider traders of options on the same stock. 2 Surprisingly, the Note ignored the fact that Congress has already approved such an action in section 2o(d) of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. 3 The Note acknowledged that "section 2o(d) ... ma [de] insider trading or tipping in stock options unlawful to the same extent as trading or tipping in the underlying security," but the author erroneously concluded that " [t] his provision applies only to SEC enforcement suits." 4 The Note's restrictive interpretation is plainly wrong. Section 2o(d) provides:
Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in possession of, material nonpublic information would violate, or result in liability to any purchaser or seller of the security under any provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder, such conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option, or privilege with respect to such security or with respect to a group or index of securities including such security, shall also violate and result in comparable liability to any purchaser or seller of that security under such provision, rule, or regulation. Although the reference to "comparable liability" leaves open important questions concerning the extent of the plaintiff class 6 and the nature of the remedy, the last clause of this provision unambiguously refers to private causes of action.
The clause is ambiguous, however, in its reference to "that security." The phrase could mean either the underlying security (for example, the common stock) or the derivative security (for example, the option). 7 Under the first interpretation, Congress authorized a private cause of action against insider option traders only for plaintiffs who had traded the underlying stock. Under the second interpretation, Congress authorized a private cause of action against insider option traders only for plaintiffs who had traded the equivalent option. In its Supreme Court brief, the United States advanced an alternative theory to justify Chiarella's conviction. The brief argued that, by trading, Chiarella, whose direct employer was a financial printer preparing takeover announcements, breached his duty to his indirect employers, the acquiring corporations. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. The Court did not rule on the validity of this "misappropriation theory" because it had not been submitted to the jury. See id. at 235-36. See generally Wang, supra, at (discussing the iob-5 .misappropriation theory"); infra note 13 (discussing the theory's use by private plaintiffs). In Carpenter v. United States, io8 S. Ct. 316 (1987) , an evenly divided Supreme Court upheld criminal convictions under § io(b) and rule lob-5 based on the "misappropriation theory," but the opinion dealt only with the defendants' concurrent mall and wire fraud convictions (which the Court upheld unanimously). For example, if, in a given set of circumstances, a corporate officer would violate the antifraud provisions by purchasing any securities issued by his employer, subjecting himself to liability to selling shareholders, then he would violate the antifraud provisions to the same extent by purchasing options with respect to these securities, and subject himself to comparable liability to selling option holders and other similarly situated persons in the derivative market. (1984) ; see also infra note 13 (discussing Moss).
Nevertheless, many commentators disagree with my conclusion that only the party in contractual privily can bring a private iob-5 action against the stock market insider trader under the "special relationship" theory. Professor Langevoort, for example, states:
It is possible to read Chiarella as saying that only the party in privity has standing to sue.... But this is little more than inference drawn from dicta, probably not enough to overcome the legitimate concern expressed in Shapiro that a privity requirement in The Second Circuit has since held that trading stock on material nonpublic information does not make the defendant trader liable to "marketplace," or even "contemporaneous," traders, if liability under rule iob-5 is based on the "misappropriation" theory. See Moss, 719 F.2d at o-13, i5-16. See generally supra note 5. Moss at least limits the scope of Wilson's "contemporaneous trader" holding. One might argue that Moss raises doubts as to Wilson's continued vitality. Moss does not refer to Wilson, however. Therefore, the appropriate interpretation of Moss is that it implicitly limits the Wilson holding to defendants who breach a "special relationship."
The above discussion deals with rule iob-5. Under certain circumstances, rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240. I4e-3 (1987) , prohibits individuals from tipping or trading on the basis of material information about an impending tender offer. One lower court, for example, has allowed a private cause of action for "relief" analogously situated option-trading plaintiffs an equivalent private cause of action against insider traders of options. In short, the legislative history of section 2o(d) clearly demonstrates that Congress enacted the provision to remedy one of the problems discussed in the Note. A private cause of action against insider traders of options is now available to option-trading plaintiffs.
